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Policy Implications of lludget Deficit Targets
Abstract
I analyze ln this paper a financial program found commonly ln developing
countries that are engaged in improving structural imbalances.

Similar programs

have also been adopted in industrialized countries, in the U.K. since 1980 and
in the U.S. since 1984.

A typical financial program consists of a target budget

deficit, an independent monetary (domestic credit) policy, and the government
budget constraint.

For such a program, I ShOH that the endogeneity of the

issuance of nominal bonds is not sufficient to satisfy both the government
budget constraint and the deficit target.

Such a program is feasible provided

bonds are issued endogenously to satisfy the deficit target and either lump sum
t~~es

and/or discretionary spending are adjusted endogenously to satisfy the

budget constraint.

Lump sum taxes are not dissimilar from U.K. government

receipts from North Sea oil and gas production or proceeds from selling
government assets.

In the absence of ready access to such receipts, if taxes

are not raised and/or spending is not cut, the policy package Hill be infeasible
as the government budget constraint cannot be satisfied.
Recent policy packages and the resulting fiscal performances ln the U.K.
and in the U.S. economies provide empirical support to the analytical result of
this paper.

In particular, bonds and discretionary government expenditure have

been used as tHO endogenous policies satisfying the constraint on the budget
deficit and the budget balance.

In the

ca~e

of the U.K., increased receipts

from the production of North Sea oil and gas in the early 1980s provided a
temporary alternative to reducing government spending.

Policy Implications of Budget Deficit Targets
1.

Introduction
Fiscal authorities frequently react to macroeconomic imbalances by adopting

policies aimed at reducing government budget deficits with a view to reducing
aggregate demand and influencing other key variables in the economy.1

Such

authorities in a growing number of developing countries adopted reduced budget
deficit targets in the late 1970s and the 1980s. 2 Deficit targets involving
gradual reductions several years ahead were introduced voluntarily by the
authorities in the U.K. and in the U.S. in the 1980s.

The U.K. government under

llIrs. Margaret Thatcher introduced deficit targets as part of its
Financial Strategy (llITFS) in the Jlarch 1980 budget.

~Iedium

Term

In the U. S. , although

formal deficit reduction targets over several years \;ere enacted in 1985, a
permanent statutory debt ceiling has existed since 1947.

The cumulative effects

of successive budget deficits meant that by 1958 the debt ceiling could not be
satisfied without the U.S. Treasury reneging on some federal government
obligations.

As a result, between 1958 and 1985, U.S. Congress raised the

statutory debt ceiling 45 times from an initial level of $275 billion to
$2,078.7 billion.

This rapid growth In the debt ceiling began to worry the U.S.

Congress by mid-1980s.

In 1984, Congress became concerned that the actual and

projected high budgetary deficits as well as the debt-service ratio would

lEconomists differ in opInIons on the precise macroeconomic effects of budget
deficits. For a succinct discussion. see Yellen (1989).
2[letween 1971 and 1988, /9 mainly developing country members of the
International Jlonetary Fund (HIP) adopted economic programs averaging over five
years in each country \>'ith the programs !lsHally requiring a reduced ratio of
government budget deficits to gross domestic product. These programs were in
the form of standby and extended standby arrangement facilities of the DIF, for
a total of 412 program yea.rs. The U. K. \;as the only major industrialized
country to have had such facilities in three years (197;,), 1977, and 19(8). Data
derived from DIF Snrvev (various issues).

2

jeopardize the economic recovery that began in the previous year.

Initially,

policies I-lere adopted in the form of tCL'\: freeze I,hich postponed 11 ta.'{
reductions scheduled to take effect in that year and in the subsequent years.
In the follol-ling year, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985 - - popularly knOl-lll as the Gramm- Rudman- lIoll ings lal-l - - '-las passed.

This

Act has been revised since, but the basic element of the lal-l requires achieving
successively 10l-ler projected budget deficit levels and a balanced budget nOI-l by
1993'":
The def ici t reducing programs have all hall the follOlving common features.
In the developing countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs
requiring reduced budget deficits usually also specify domestic credit ceilings,
thereby controlling the economy's money supply.3

In the U.K., the voluntary

policy package introduced by the Thatcher government consisted of targeting both
the budget deficit and the grOl-lth rate of money.-±
policy targets the budget deficit level.

In the U.S., the government

But, because the Federal Open Market

Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System independently sets the monetary
policy, the federal governnlent must take the money supply as given exogenously.
Thus, in all the examples of budget deficit targets, the fiscal authorities can
decide to achieve the target and satisfy the government budget constraint by
some combination of issuing bonds, raising tax rates that I-lill generate higher
ta.'{ revenue, or reducing discretionary government spending.
Examinations of the U.K. and U.S. data suggest that discretionary
government expenditure has been de facto a second endogenous policy choice, in
addition to endogenous bonds.

Adoption of deficit reduction targets has

3The relationship betl-leen domestic credit <lnd the money supply is described
sectioll 2.
-!The monetary target I-las introduced I,ith a nel, to reducing the domestic
inflation rate.
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contributed to trimming the budget deficit ratios In both countries (see
Table 1).

Reductions achieved in the U.K. economy are more drastic owing to the

length of time over \;hich the deficit reduction policies have been maintained.
The def icit rat io has been reduced sharply from . L 6 percent of gross domest ic
product in 1980 to 0.8 percent in 198/.

necause this measure of deficit

exaggerates the underlying achievements, I adjust the reported deficits to
exclude from revenue government asset sale proceeds and royalties received from
oil and gas explorations to provide a better indication of the underlying trend
in the budget deficit.

Even the adjusted deficit ratio indicates that the

authorities have maintained a successful bndget deficit reduction program.
adjusted deficit ratio has been trimmed from 1.1 to 2.6 percent.

The

Initially,

because of improved tax: performances oh'ing to higher ta.'C receipts from oil and
gas-related productions, the government expenditure remained high.

nut, as the

oil sector \;eakened in the more recent years, some expenditure cuts have also
been made.

In the U.S., the deficit ratio was 6.2 percent in 1983 but it was

reduced to 3.3 percent in 1988. 5

This sharp reduction was accompanied by

reduced government expenditure ratios and virtually unchanged tax performance.
These fiscal outcomes lend empirical support to the theoretical result of this
paper that successful deficit reductions are accompanied by reduced government
spending \,:'hen the monetary policy is exogenously set.

In the case of the U.K.,

increased tax receipts from production of l'\orth Sea oil and gas in the early
1980s provided a temporary alternative to reducing government spending.

:In the calculation of the deficit. 0p0ratioll of the Social Security Trust Funds
have been consolidated with the central government. This is in conformity with
their treatment in the U.S. budget presentation as ~ell as with budget data for
the U.K. discussed previously.

Tahle 1. Select.ed Consolidated Central Government lIudgetary Data
of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 1971-88 1
Average for

Ifl74-7fl

1980

1981

19K'1.

19R1

19Rfi

19R'1

1980

\0R7

InKS

Un perr.rnt of gross dOlllest.ic Ilrodllr.t.)
Total revenue and grants

II.K.
II.S.A.

JI.II

:16.0
20.9

9

:19.3

18.1

19.4

21.8

21. :1

20.0

Tax re\'ellue
U.K.
U.S.A.

30.0

31.0

31.9

:14.2

19.8

19.3

~lG.

:18.1
10.7

18.1
20.3

38.1
H1.8

:17 .5
20.7

20.2

:13. I
17.7

33.5

33.5

17.7

18.2

34.0
17.9

33.4
18.8

18.6

18.0

ELl

4.4
1.4

5.0
1.8

5.0

5. I

5.0

2.3

4.6
2.1

4.1

2.0

1.8
2.0

4. I

2.0

1.9

1.9

1.6

39.8

40.6
23.8

41.6
24.5

42.7
25.4

12.5

41.5
21.6

41.3
25.7

40.0

26.2

24.9

38.3
21.0

23.5

3.5

4.1

4.2

1.7

2.4

2.7

4.0
3.1

4.0
3.3

1.1
3.4

4.1
3.9

4.1
3.8

4.0
3.6

:1.5

- 5.1
-7.2

-4.0

- II. 7
- G.8

- :1.1

- 5.7

- 4 .'1
- 6. 5

-1.9

- 0.8
- 2.6 3

- 2.7

- 4. 1

- 6. 2

lILher revellue alld grilllts
U. K.

U.S.A.
Total expenditure and lIet lending
U.K.

U.S.A.

Of which: interest payments
U.K.

U.S.A.

21.9

lIvllrall Ildicit:1

U.K.
U.K. (adju:;tcdp
U.S.A.

MemorandnlU items:
lIlIt.:;t.andill~ deht
U.K. ~elld·llarch)
U.S.A. (elld- of- period)
(: ross domest ic prodllct
U.K. (Tn billions of pOlllld:;)
U.S.A. (fll billions of dollar:;)
SOllrces:

- 2.5

-7. I
- 2.9

- :1. 2

-:3. 2

- 5.2
- 4.9

- 5.2
- 5.4

- 3.7 3
- 5.1

- 3.3

-:3.3

117.7
12.1

43. t

43.7

408.6
4,407.8

4,759.6

4!J..I

Illi. 3

11:3. (i

,lUi

28.5

28.4

31.:\

·16.0
36.3

117.6

27.8

37.3

'17.1
110.0

1:17 .9
1,8:l!J.3

:2:10.6
2,619.0

25'1. 8

277 .2
3,088.:3

:302.0

377 .5

3,273.2

321.4
3,(i47.0

15:\.7

2,9:17.3

3,009.2

1I,lfi:J.3

f

fntenliltional Monetary 1'lllld, GOVr.l'JIIIII~nt. rin<lIH:r. St.atistil:s Yl'arhonk (198-1, 1987, allli 1989).

U.K. yrar-cntling llecemlJr.r 31, and U.S. ycar-ending Jllne 3D throllgh 1976 and Scptcmher 30 t.hereafter.
Il if fers f 1'0111 t.he report.l'd def icit in L1lll pre\' i OilS I inc by t.he

financing itelll rather than a sOllrce of govcrnmellt revcnue.

<111101111 t 0

Assnmed royalties to rcmain at t.he 1985 level of U.K. £2.5 billion.

f asset sales and royal t. ies, wh ieh is treated now as a spec iaL
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Literature on the government budget constraint has considered mainly the
consequences of recognizing a government budget constraint in the standard
macroeconomic models.

A seminal paper by lliinder and SOlOlv (1973), follOlving

the pioneering lvorks of Ott and Ott (106:'5) and Christ (1961; 1968) earlier,
established the fact that the government cannot independently set ta.,<:es and
government spending and control the issuance of money and bonds to the private
sector.

The government budget constraint requires that one of these variables

must be endogenously set.

In a related literature, Tobin and lluiter (1976) have

shown that constancy of real public spending inclusive of debt interest is
compatible Ivith the dynamic stability of pure bond finance. 6 This necessarily
implies that the government glves up an additional degree of freedom to choose
its policy variables independently.

I make this point explicit by extending the

standard government budget constraint Iitenlture Ivith an additional constraint
in the form of a target budget deficit.

The deficit target ensures that the

path of the real bond stock cannot explode because the target level implies a
fixed path for government spending inclusive of interest payments.

This is the

crucial mechanism for dynamic stability in optimizing and ad hoc extended IS/LM
models.
I sholv that the endogeneity of the issuance of nominal bonds is not
sufficient to satisfy both the government budget constraint and the deficit
target.

Endogenous bonds will satisfy the deficit target, but an additional

policy instrument must be used to satisfy the government budget constraint.

If

monetary grOlvth rate is not also subject to a target, this Ivill usually mean the

6The usual result in dynamic IS/L31 models with a Phillips curve is that
constancy of real public spending inclusive of debt interest is compatihle with
stability of pure bonu finance but not: snfficient for it. The determinant of
the relevant Jacobian matrix has the right sign for stability, but the sign of
the trace is ambiguous.

government endogenously selects either tax rates: government spending: or the
issuance of money to satisfy its budget constraint.

In countries where the

central bank independently sets the monetary policy, such as in the U.S., the
choice is limited to endogenously choosing

tc"LX

rates or government spending.

Given also the limitations on governments to freely set the tax rates, the
difficulty ln the developing countries of improving tax collections through more
efficient tax administration or altering nondiscretionary government spending,
the only choice variable remains the discretionary part of government spending.
Thus, a policy package involving a target budget deficit: an independent path
for the money supply, and no ta.x increases requires the fiscal authorities to
issue bonds and adjust discretionary government spending endogenously.

The

introduction of a budget deficit target requires nOI, tl,O: not one, endogenous
government policy variables.
Although there has been no publishell literature dealing l-lith the choice of
government policies "hen budget deficits are targeted, policymakers and
international monetary officials that advise governments to adopt policy
packages involving deficit targets have been dealing l-lith the issues as they
have occurred.

Clear understanding by the fiscal authorities of the

implications of introducing and then luaintaining such deficit targets will
prevent unpleasant surprises.

Recognition that maintaining 101, government

budget def icits ,-lith a viel-l to avert ing macroeconomic imbalances and providing
conditions for sustainell economic grol"th I,ill require cuts in discretionary
expenditure in order to balance the bndget "ill provide a better environment for
careful selection of expenditure programs.

At present: countries "ith chronic

needs for balance of payments support from tile Dlf require continued access to
its credit facilities, and so these countries must satisfy any budget deficit

6

targets agreed upon mutually.

The DIF progl"C\.ms only specify an overall budget

deficit target to avoid the appearance of blatant political interference in the
allocation of government resources among competing demands by different groups
within a country.

The country authorities must then decide how to achieve the

target budget def icits.

As the analyt ical result shOl':s belOlv, any def icit

target can be met by new bond issues, but developing countries \vith nIF programs
in place must adjust government spellJing to satisfy budget constraints while
they continue maintaining independent dOluestic credit ceilings. 7

Political

difficulties in cutting expenditures on social programs make it almost certain
that these countries \vill first trim prograullued capital or capital maintenance
expenditures.

The temporary gains made in 10l,:er budget deficits are lost \vhen

countries are no longer subjected to Dlf moui taring.

\~hen

the balance of

payments difficulties become less serious. these COllntries expand expenditures
in curtailed areas to prevent further deterioration in their capital stock and
thereby raise the budget def ici t I,:i th eventual re- emergence of macroeconomic
imbalances.
The process that ensures target budget deficits are satisfied is also
similar in the U.K. and in the U.S.

In the U.K .. successive budget deficit

targets I"ere satisf ied initially by increased revenue flOlvs from the North Sea
oil and gas production.

Proceeds from selling government assets also helped to

l0'ver the published deficits and contributed to halting the rapid grmvth in the
consolidated central government debt.

In recent years. as the oil sector

I.;eakened and tax revenue performance dcteriora,tC'll ~ the government reduced
7The policy package raises an interest ing pl"oblE'IU for policymakers and advisors.
The choice of domestic credit ceilings amI endogenous issuance of bonds to
satisfy budget deficits may not clear the of tell thin ?;overnment securities
markets as the independent path for cretlits ~ill resutt generally in a market
interest rate different from the government securities market-clearing interest
rate.

I

cOll~traint.

expenditures to satisfy its budget

In the U.S., the lalV provides

for an automatic trigger mechanism in the form of sequestration involving
projected expenditure cuts to facilitate achieving projected budget deficit
levels.

Sequestration is an automatic deficit-reuuction procedure established

by the U.S. Congress in 1985 and it applies if a projected deficit exceeds the
target alllount in the Act.
President presents a budget

In this tougher budget enforcement process, the
\~ith

a lleficit aimed at the target deficit by making

changes in any of revenue or expenditure. S Congress has betlVeen January and
September to make any changes.

If,

Oll

September 1, Congress does not agree on

the target deficit figure, the President has to issue the Sequester Order.

Then

Congress has until October 1 to unllo any seClllestration the President says he
,~ill

do.

If no agreement is reached beth'een Congress and the President, the

Sequester Order is implemented

Oil

all lloll-exempted government expenditures.

Congress has nolV exempted t\\o- thirds of goverllment expenditure from any
Sequester Order and introducell "creative" accoullting techniques 9 that have
diminished the effectiveness of the deficit targets.

Nevertheless, the process

raises the deficit issue annually for puillic discussions.

Also, through the

provision of the Sequester Order, it is recogllized that government expenditures
may have to be adjusted in order to satisfy the governulent budget constraint,
IVhile endogenous issue of bonds

~ill

satisfy the deficit target.

The analytical result presented in this paper has an important message for
the current budgetary debate in tile U.S.A. us well as for debates in developing

8 Note,

the emphasis is on cuts to dchieve budget llef icits rather than satisfying
the government budget constraint.
9Creative accounting techniques include the inclusion of the Social Security
Trust Funds and the exclusioll of Postal System. as ~ell as the creation of a
shell company to borrolV for the purpose of tite sayings and loans bailout, ,.ith a
vie,~ to obtaining a smaller proj ected hudget llef ic it to minimize the application
of the Sequester Order.
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countries.

If the President \;ill not accept ta.\: increases and the Congress \"i11

not accept cuts In discretionary government spending, reduced budget deficits as
required by the Gramm- Rudman-Hollings lCl\; cannot be achieved.

Attempts by these

t,;o branches of the U. S. government to sho\{ that the la,{ is sat isf ied by
creative accounting will not reduce the large budget deficits.

In the

developing countries that adopt IMP-supported financial programs,

polic~uakers

and the political leadership must understand that budget deficit reductions
necessarily imply sustained expenditure Cilts or improved government receipts
through better tax administration.

If pro::;pects for higher ta.'{ receipts are

slim, then there is no alternative to reducillg discretionary government spending
short of reneging on outstanding

govel~nlent

prospect of rapid inflation rates.

debt or money financing with the

Therefore: in countries that have serious

structural imbalances, political leadel'ship::; need to prepare the voters
psychologically for sustained cuts in government spending.

This may prevent

unpleasant surprises for governments that seriously attempt to reduce budget
deficits.

The dmmfall of the Seaga government in Jamaica in the 1989 general

election and the repeated coup attempts in Nigeria against the Dabandiga
government are t,,;o examples of papillar response::; to successful reduct ions of
budget deficits obtained In periods of c\'i:-;i::; by drastic reductions in
discretionary government spending.

.\ better appl'8ciat ion of the policy

limitations imposed by the typica.l financial program \,rill facilitate early
attempts at gradual reductions in

discn~tiollttry

government spending that may

prevent "knee-jerk" reactions by the voters.
I have organized the paper a,s fo1101';::3.

III section 2, I specify a financial

program consisting of a government budget con:)traint, a budget deficit target,
and an independent path for the money snpply.

In sect ion :3, I describe the

private economy \,.hich simllltaneollsly interacts h'ith the financial program of the

9

government sector to determine the macroeconomIC outcomes.

The private sector

consists of market efficiency conditions for money, capital, and
interest-bearing securities and the goods market-clearing condition.

In section

4 and in the Appendix, I address the question of the feasibility of the
financial program by identifying the policy variables that must be endogenously
dotermined to satisfy the financial program.

I demonstrate that the feasibility

is nontrivial by establishing that the economic variables have unique values
both in the steady state and along the dynamic convergent path.

Finally, I make

concluding remarks in section 5.

2.

A Financial Program
I address the issues discussed in the preVIOUS section as the feasibility

of a financial program consisting of a government budget constraint, a budget
deficit target, and an independent path for the money supply.

I analyze such a

program In a closed economy Ivhere (a) the government is not engaged in
investment expenditures and (b) the government's revenues are generated
costlessly from the issuance of base money, interest-bearing securities issued
as perpetuity bonds, and the collection of lump sum and marginal

t~~es

on

private incomes.
Because the government budget deficit is equal to the excess of government
spending plus net interest payments over tax revenue, the government budget
constraint is simply the requirement that any deficit must be financed either by
issuing money or bonds.

At each instant, this requirement implies that

g + (l-t)eb -

T -

tf(k)

=m+

q& + (m+qb)7.

(1)

The left hand side of this equation is the real budget deficit Ivhile the right
side is an indication that this deficit may be financed by either issuing real
money (~jP) or real bonds (qOjP).

The variables are defined as follows:

10

g

= real

on a bond, b
T

= lump

m = jI/P

= marginal t~x
bonds, H = number of

government spending, t

= HIP = real

bonds,

= production as a function
balance, q = price of a real

sum tax, f(k)

= real

money

anticipated rate of inflation.

of capital to labor ratio (k),
bond (b), and

t~xes

10

= PIP = fully

In this specification of the government budget,

government policy decisions relate to five variables.
spending (g), real

= nominal coupon payment
P = price of goods,

rate, e

(t and T), monetary policy

These are real government

(~I),

and bond issues

Literature addressing government budget constraint has

nOI~

(H).

established that

at most four of these preceding policy variables may be chosen independently and
the fifth then determined to balance the government budget, given the structure
of the economy and its agents' preferences.

The second specification in a

financial program involving an additional constraint imposed through a
restriction on the size of the budget deficit

I~ill

place a further limitation on

the government's ability to choose freely its policy variables.

It does not

matter analytically whether this restriction on deficit is specified in levels
or in ratio to gross domestic product.
g + (1- t) e b -

T -

Consider
tf (k) = Rf (k), R > O.

(2)

Equation (2) indicates that the budget deficit ratio is required to be some
arbitrary ratio R.

This type of formulation is more common In the DIF- supported

financial programs introduced In the developing countries.

In the U.K., the

UTFS includes a deficit target such as (2) with R declining over time.
U. S., the Gramm- Rudman- Hollings

la,~

In the

targets reductions initially in the forecast

deficit levels and R = 0 in fiscal year 1993.

Equation (2) may be used In

analyzing the feasihilitv of all financial programs, including the U.S. program.
Finally, an independent monetary policy requires specifying a path for the
money supply.

If nominal money gro\,s at a constant rate B and at the initial

11

date the outstanding nominal money stock (11 0 ) is predetermined, then real money
balances groH according to

m = (B- iT)m.

(3)

In the developing countries with IMF programs, the target is specified on
domestic credits rather than on money supply directly.

But, by assumption 1n

this paper, monetary institutions can not have any foreign assets or
liabilities.

So, domestic credit equals to total liabilities plus net worth.

Since total assets must equal total liabilities plus net \Vorth of all monetary
institutions, and the money supply is only a subset of total liabilities,
equation (3) remains useful in addressing the question of setting a ceiling on
domestic credits.

In the U.K., B has been specified for inside money as 'iell

as, since 1984, outside money (MO) that is close to the definition of JI in this
paper.

The JITFS specified a declining B over time.

In the U. S., B is

determined by decisions taken by the FOMC of the Federal Reserve System and it
is not directly controlled by the fiscal authorities.

3.

The Private Economy
A financial program consisting of equations (1) to (3) 1S satisfied by the

simultaneous interactions with private behavioral equations as \VeIl as the goods
market-clearing condition.

A Sidrauski-Brock optimizing model over an infinite

horizon and under perfect foresight provides the following familiar conditions
for private behavior (see llegg and Haque (1984) or Fischer (1979)):
Money market:

(4)

Um = Uc (r+/i)

Capital market:

(l-t)f/(k) =

Euler equation:

- l\/U = r - 6
c

l'

+ 0, and

(5)
(6)

Notations UIII and Uc denote marginal utility of money (m) and consumption (c) ,
respectively. r is the real implicit return on long bonds, 6 is the rate of

12

capital depreciation, f'(k) is the marginal product of capital, and
pure rate of time preference.

¢ is the

The preceding optimal behavioral equations are

augmented by the following securities market efficiency condition when
government securities are introduced as an alternative form of financial assets
in the private portfolio:
q/q

+

(l-t)e/q

=r

+ ~.

(7)

To analyze the feasibility of the financial program specified in Section 2,
I complete the model specification by assuming that the goods market clears.

That is, output is divided among private and government consumption and gross
investment as in equation (8).
f(k)

4.

=c

+

g + ~ + ok.

(8)

The Feasibility Problem
The feasibility of the financial program is assured if the model

represented by equations (1) to (8) has a unique fonmrd-looking path as its
solution.

The necessary and sufficient conditions for this path being unique

are that there exist unique steady state values, a convergent subspace In the
equations system that describes the dynamic evolution of the economy, and an
exact number of initial conditions to tie dOl{n a unique point in the convergent
subspace.
Denote the steady state values by superscript

*

I assume the real money

stock is constant in the steady state so the perfectly anticipated inflation
rate equals the rate of nominal money growth (see equation 3) -- i.e.,
~

* = ().

(9)

From equation (6), the real interest rate is equal to the rate of pure time
discount:
r*

=¢

(10)

because I assume real consumption and real money balances are constant.
Equation (5) then implies

*
(l-t)f/(k)

=

9+ 0

(11)

and so this modified golden rule establishes a unique capital stock.

Because

(9 + B) and the coupon payment on bonds (e) are
constant, the bond price q* must be constant. Indeed, from equation (7),
q* = (l-t)ej(¢+B).

the nominal interest rate

(12)

Since real \,realth must be constant, and q* is constant , it follmis that

]) = O.

(13)

The expression for the goods market clearing condition is:
f(k *)

= c*

+

g

+

ok *

(14)

and it determines a unIque private consumption level c* , given the level of real
public spending and the rate of capital depreciation. 1o
With a unique real consumption (c *), demand for real money balances (m *) is
then solved from the money market condition (15) (obtained from equation (4)) .
Um(c * ,m *)jUc(c * ,m *)

= ¢ +

(15)

B.

But, because this condition is nonlinear, m* may have multiple solutions.

The

follo\iing analysis establishes that, provided money and consumption are normal
or inferior goods and remain so for all feasible solutions, then the money

*
market condition solves for a unique ill.

The slope of the money market

condition in the (c,m)-plane is

(16)

\ihere J 1

')

==

(Uem Uc-Ucc Uill )jUC and

J2

==

2

(Umill Uc- Uem U)
ill jUc .

lOCondition (14) also ShOliS that private consumption in the steady state IS
positive provided that output net of capital depreciation exceeds public
consumption of goods and services.
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Both J 1 and J 2 are evaluated at their steady state values. Restrictions J 1 > 0
> J 2 ensure money and consumption are normal goods (see Fischer, 1979). Thus,
the slope dm *Ide * is negative.

Figures 1 and 2 show the graph for the money

market condition, under the assumption of both normal or inferior goods.

In

tlW

possible cases, given a unique c* = co the money market condition provides a
unique m* = mo.
FiCTure
2
o

Figure 1
"..

,)".

\

I Jloney

m

m*=m o

m

I market

/ condition

m* =m

.//t

;-.-------;

o

o

\.
/Money
\ -/ market
' 'C condition

---------:.1'

1-1

't "~

c *=c o

o

c

Money and consumption are normal
goods or both are inferior.

c*=c o

c

Either money or consumption is an
inferior good.

Thus, even though the money market condition is nonlinear, m* is unique under
the standard assumption that money and consumption goods are normal.
There remain expressions for the government budget constraint and the
budget deficit targets:
m*B = o

(j



7 -

tf(k *)

+

9(1-t)eb *I(¢+B)

(17)

(18)
7 - tf(k *) + (l-t)eb *
Rf(k *) = b
* * *
The knowledge of k , m , q and the constant parameters is sufficient to solve
(j



for a unique real bond stock b* from the government budget constraint,
simultaneously satisfying itself and the private sector's optimal behavioral
equations.

The real bond stock thus obtained must be unique precisely because
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the equation is linear in the UnknO\in .11

HOI{ever, unique values of the capital

stock and the number of bonds \{ill not generally satisfy the steady state
version of the real budget deficit target, equation (18).

Hence, given a real

budget deficit target, it is not generally feasible to set independent paths for
government spending, taxes, and the money supply.

At least one must be

determined endogenously, together "ith the number of bonds.

t~x

If the marginal

rate is specified as an endogenous policy variable, then it is not possible to
rule out multiple perfect foresight paths because the steady state values are
not unique In general.

Instead, either real government spending or lump sum

taxes must be made endogenous.

In the formulation of this paper, these

t\iO

have

qualitatively similar steady state and dynamic stability properties because
government spending does not enter the utility function in a nonlinear fashion.
To s1101,1 hOl,l a real stock of bonds b* and lump sum

t~x T

* or discretionary

government spending g* are chosen to balance the government budget and satisfy
the budget deficit target, substitute for
constraint into

or g from the government budget

T

(17) to obtain

*
Rf(k)

= 8(m *

+ q*b*).

(19)

1{ith k* , m*, q* already solved, the preceding equation determines b* gIven the

*
steady state fiscal deficit Rf(k).

In particular,

*
b* = [ Rf (k ) - m*]/q * .
8
By substituting this unIque value of b* In the government budget constraint
(16), the follo"ing equation is obtained:

g

+

¢Rf(k *)/8

= (9

+

8)m*

IlFrom equation (17), the real bond stock is
revenue, inclusive of inflation tax, exceeds
services. At an intuitive level, a positive
steady state is possible if the government's
finance interest payments on a constant real

+ T +

tf(k *).

posItIve if total government
go\'ernment expenditure on goods and
real bond stock consistent "ith a
t~~ revenue is sufficient to
stock of perpetuity bonds.
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This equation then determines a unique g* or

T

* to satisfy the government budget

constraint.
The establishment of unique steady state values in the preceding analyses
confirms that a financial program similar to the MTFS in the U.K., the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction program in the U.S., and the
BIF- supported programs in developing countries are feasible with bond issues and
lump sum taxation or government spending as two simultaneous endogenous policy
decisions. 12

I show in the Appendix that dynamic stability is ensured for an

optimizing monetary model in which lump sum taxes or discretionary government
spending change endogenously to satisfy the government budget balance and, gIven
this, the bond issues are endogenous to satisfy the budget deficit target.

In

this sense, something akin to the MTFS, the Gramm- Rudman- Hollings law, and DIF
programs in developing countries are desirable.

The budget deficit target

ensures that the real bond stock cannot explode because it implies a fixed path
for government spending inclusive of interest payments.

This is the crucial

mechanism for dynamic stability in this framel.;ork, as is the case in ad hoc
extended IS/UI models .13

12This feasibility will not in general extend to the case of indexed coupon
payments on government bonds. The compensation offered to economic*a~ents for
inflation implies that there is no inflation t~~ on bonds (i.e., 8q b does not
appear in equation (19)). This means that in the steady state the inflation tax
* must equal the real budget deficit Hhich in turn must equal
on money (8m)
Rf (k *). Vith k* , m* , and 8 follo\,Iing a constant path, R cannot then be an
exogenous variable.
13When coupon values are fixed in nominal terms, Haque (1985) shaHS that simple
endogenous bond finance in optiIllizin~ monetary ~ro\.;th models of the type adopted
in this paper are dynamically unstable: a similar result can also be derived
with extended IS/LM models.
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5.

Concluding Remarks
I analyzed in this paper a typical financial program found commonly in

developing countries that are engaged in improving structural imbalances with
assistance from the International

~Ionetary

Fund.

Similar programs have also

been adopted in industrialized countries, in the United Kingdom since 1980 and
in the United States since 1984.

The typical financial program consists of a

target budget deficit, an independent monetary or domestic credit policy, and a
government budget constraint.

By considering a private sector whose behavioral

equations are derived from an optimizing monetary gro\vth model, I show that such
a financial program is feasible, provided bonds are issued endogenously to
satisfy the budget deficit target and either lump sum

t~xes

and/or discretionary

government spending are adjusted endogenously to satisfy the government budget
constraint.

Lump sum

t~xes

are not dissimilar from U.K. government receipts

from North Sea oil and gas production or proceeds from selling government
assets.

But most countries with a financial program do not have ready access to

such receipts, so they must use discretionary government spending and issue
bonds endogenously to satisfy the typical financial program.

Given this fact,

countries that intend to reduce budget deficits must accept cuts in
discretionary government spending and/or raise

t~xes.

If taxes are not raised

or spending is not cut, budget deficit targets cannot be maintained.

Appendix:

Dynamic Stability

The dynamic path is examined by linearizing the behavioral equations, the
money supply rule, the government budget constraint, and the real budget deficit
target in the neighborhood of the unique steady state equilibrium.

Differential

equations system (Ai) and static equations (A2) and (A3) are obtained from
equations (1) - (8).

Denoting vector transpose by T, the following notation is

adopted:
T
x = (k,c,m,q,b)

m
q

x

= d/ds(x).

o

o

Em *J 2

o

o

c

Fm *

o

o

m

o

(¢

B)

o

q

- Bb */q *

-B

b

-1

*
-F(D+Em)

=

- x*

o

(¢+ot) / (1- t)
c

=x

x

Fb *+Rf'/q *

*
*
-bJ-B/q
2 2

+

(Ai)

* * ' E == Ucm/U
* * ' F == (1-t)f', f" = d/dk(f'(k)), and Ji's
,;here D == Uc/U
cc
cc
(i = 1,2) are evaluated at the steady state values. The solutions obtained for

(k,c,m)

are then used to solve for

r

and ~ in the follo,;ing equations.
A

r
7r

=

A

= Fk

c + J 2m -

J1

(12)
r.

(A3)

The triangular structure of the coefficient matrix in the differential
equations system (Ai) shows that t,w eigenvalues are:

B > 0) and ¢

+

- B (negative provided

B (positive). The remaining three eigenvalues are obtained from

the top left hand side 3x3 submatrix, ,;hose determinant is negative while the

trace is positive.

Hence the 5x5 differential system has exactly two negative

and three positive eigenvalues and is a regular saddlepath if, and only if,
there are exactly two initial conditions.

Private consumption (c), price of

bonds (q), and the price of goods are endogenous and capable of instantaneous
jumps.

Nominal money and the number of bonds are instantaneously predetermined.

Although their real values may take on any value at the initial date, the jump
in the price level cannot alter the money-to-bond ratio and this imposes one
initial condition.

The inherited capital stock ko (the outcome of previous
investment decisions) is a second initial condition. Thus, under budget deficit

and monetary targets, endogenous issuance of bonds and lump sum

t~~es

or

discretionary government spending, the economy is characterized by a regular
saddlepath and it proceeds along its unique self-fulfilling forward-looking
convergent path to the steady state from the initial date on.
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